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Abstract
In this paper, we aim to develop a novel mechanism to preserve differential privacy
(DP) in adversarial learning for deep neural networks, with provable robustness to
adversarial examples. We leverage the sequential composition theory in differential
privacy, to establish a new connection between differential privacy preservation
and provable robustness. To address the trade-off among model utility, privacy loss,
and robustness, we design an original, differentially private, adversarial objective
function, based on the post-processing property in DP, to tighten the sensitivity of
our model. Theoretical analysis and thorough evaluations show that our mechanism
notably improves the robustness of DP deep neural networks.
1 Introduction
In spite of advantages in terms of application utility, the pervasiveness of machine learning exposes
new vulnerabilities in software systems. Adversaries can conduct devastating attacks, in which
deployed machine learning models can be used (a) to reveal sensitive information in private training
data [1–4], and/or (b) to make the models misclassify, such as adversarial examples [5–7]. Efforts to
prevent such devastating attacks typically seek one of three solutions: (1) Models which preserve
differential privacy (DP) [16], a rigorous cryptography-based formulation of privacy in probabilistic
terms, thereby preventing revelation of sensitive information about the subjects involved in the training
data [8, 9]; (2) Adversarial training algorithms, which augment training data to consist of benign
examples and adversarial examples crafted during the training process, thereby empirically increasing
the classification accuracy given adversarial examples [4, 10–12]; and (3) Provable robustness, in
which the model classification given adversarial examples is theoretically guaranteed to be consistent,
i.e., a small perturbation in the input does not change the predicted label [13–15].
On one hand, private models, trained with existing privacy-preserving mechanisms, are unshielded
under adversarial examples. On the other hand, robust models, trained with adversarial learning
algorithms (with or without provable robustness to adversarial examples), do not offer privacy
protections to the training data. That poses serious risks to machine learning-based systems in critical
applications, e.g., face recognition, health care, etc.; since adversaries can attack a deployed model
by using both privacy inference attacks [1–4] and adversarial examples [5–7]. To be assured, a model
must be i) private to protect the training data, and ii) robust to adversarial examples. There is an
urgent demand to train such a secure model with a high utility. Unfortunately, there has not yet been
research on how to develop such a model, which thus remains a largely open challenge.
Preprint. Work in progress.
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Simply combining existing DP-preserving mechanisms [8, 21–24] and provable robustness conditions
[13–15] cannot solve the problem, for many reasons. (a) Existing sensitivity bounds [22–24] and
designs [8, 21] have not been developed to protect the training data in adversarial training. It is
obvious that the adversarial examples usually are very similar to the benign examples. Therefore,
using adversarial examples crafted from the private training data to train our models introduces a
previously unknown privacy risk, disclosing the participation of the benign examples. (b) There is
an unrevealed interplay between DP preservation and robustness bounds. (c) Existing algorithms
[8, 13–15, 21–24] cannot be readily applied to address the trade-off among model utility, privacy loss,
and robustness. Therefore, theoretically bounding the robustness of a model (which both protects the
privacy and is robust against adversarial examples) is nontrivial.
Our Contributions. Motivated by this open problem, we propose to develop a novel differentially
private adversarial learning (DPAL) mechanism to: 1) preserve DP of the training data, 2) be
provably and practically robust to adversarial examples, and 3) retain high model utility. In our
mechanism, privacy-preserving noise is injected into inputs and hidden layers to achieve DP in
learning private model parameters (Theorem 1). Then, we incorporate ensemble adversarial learning
into our mechanism to improve the decision boundary under DP protections. To do this, we introduce
a concept of DP adversarial examples, which are crafted using benign examples in the private training
data under DP guarantees (Eq. 10). To address the trade-off between model utility and privacy
loss, we propose a new DP adversarial objective function to tighten the model’s global sensitivity
(Theorem 2); thus, we significantly reduce the amount of noise injected into our function in learning
DP model parameters, compared with existing works [22–24].
After preserving DP in learning model parameters, we focus on establishing a solid theoretical and
practical connection among privacy preservation, adversarial learning, and provable robustness. Noise
injected into different layers is considered as a sequence of randomizing mechanisms, providing
different levels of robustness. By leveraging the sequential composition theory in DP [17], we
derive a novel generalized robustness bound, which essentially is a composition of these levels of
robustness (Theorem 3 and Proposition 1). To our knowledge, our mechanism establishes the first
connection between DP preservation to protect the training data and provable robustness against
adversarial examples in deep learning. Such a mechanism will greatly extend the applicability of
machine learning, by fortifying the models in both privacy and security aspects. Rigorous experiments
conducted on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets [18, 19] show that our mechanism notably enhances
the robustness of DP deep neural networks.
2 Background and Problem Definition
In this section, we revisit adversarial learning, DP, and introduce our problem definition. Let D
be a database that contains N tuples, each of which contains data x ∈ [−1, 1]d and a ground-truth
label y ∈ ZK , with K possible categorical outcomes. Each y is a one-hot vector of K categories
y = {y1, . . . , yK}. A single true class label yx ∈ y given x ∈ D is assigned to only one of the K
categories. On input x and parameters θ, a model outputs class scores f : Rd → RK that maps
d-dimensional inputs x to a vector of scores f(x) = {f1(x), . . . , fK(x)} s.t. ∀k ∈ [1,K] : fk(x) ∈
[0, 1] and
∑K
k=1 fk(x) = 1. The class with the highest score value is selected as the predicted
label for the data tuple, denoted as y(x) = maxk∈K fk(x). A loss function L(f(x), y) presents the
penalty for mismatching between the predicted values f(x) and original values y. The notations and
terminologies frequently used in this paper are summarized in Table 1, located in Appendix A. Let us
briefly revisit DP and DP-preserving techniques in deep learning, starting with the definition of DP.
Definition 1 (, δ)-DP [16]. A randomized algorithm A fulfills (, δ)-DP, if for any two databases
D and D′ differing at most one tuple, and for all O ⊆ Range(A), we have:
Pr[A(D) = O] ≤ ePr[A(D′) = O] + δ (1)
Here,  controls the amount by which the distributions induced by D and D′ may differ, δ is a broken
probability. DP also applies to general metrics ρ(D,D′) ≤ 1, where ρ can be a Hamming metric as
in Definition 1 and lp-norms [20]. DP-preserving algorithms in deep learning can be categorized
into two lines: 1) introducing noise into gradients of parameters [8, 21], and 2) injecting noise into
objective functions [22–24]. In Lemmas 2 and 4, we will show that our mechanism achieves better
sensitivity bounds compared with existing works [22–24].
Adversarial Learning. For some target model f and inputs (x, yx), the adversary’s goal is to find
an adversarial example xadv = x+ α, where α is the perturbation introduced by the attacker, such
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that: (1) xadv and x are close, and (2) the model misclassifies xadv, i.e., y(xadv) 6= y(x). In this paper,
we consider well-known lp∈{1,2,∞}-norm bounded attacks [5]. Let lp(µ) = {α ∈ Rd : ‖α‖p ≤ µ}
be the lp-norm ball of radius µ. One of the goals in adversarial learning is to minimize the risk over
adversarial examples: θ∗ = arg minθ E(x,ytrue)∼D
[
max‖α‖p≤µ L
(
f(x+α, θ), yx
)]
, where an attack
is used to approximate solutions to the inner maximization problem, and the outer minimization
problem corresponds to training the model f with parameters θ over these adversarial examples
xadv = x+α. There are two basic adversarial example attacks. The first one is a single-step algorithm,
in which only a single gradient computation is required. For instance, FGSM algorithm [5] finds
adversarial examples by solving the inner maximization max‖α‖p≤µ L
(
f(x+α, θ), yx
)
. The second
one is an iterative algorithm, in which multiple gradients are computed and updated. For instance, in
[25], FGSM is applied multiple times with Tµ small steps, each of which has a size of µ/Tµ.
To improve the robustness of models, prior work focused on two directions: 1) Producing correct
predictions on adversarial examples, while not compromising the accuracy on legitimate inputs
[10–12, 26–30]; and 2) Detecting adversarial examples, without introducing too many false positives
[31–35]. Among existing solutions, adversarial training appears to hold the greatest promise for
learning robust models [36]. One of the well-known algorithms was proposed in [37]. At every
training step, new adversarial examples are generated and injected into batches containing both
benign and adversarial examples. The pseudo-code of this algorithm [37] is provided in Appendix B.
Figure 1: An in-
stance of DPAL.
DP and Provable Robustness. Recently, some algorithms [13] have been
proposed to derive provable robustness, in which each prediction is guaranteed
to be consistent under the perturbation α, if a robustness condition is held. Given
a benign example x, we focus on achieving a robustness condition to attacks of
lp(µ)-norm, as follows:
∀α ∈ lp(µ) : fk(x+ α) > max
i:i 6=k
fi(x+ α) (2)
where k = y(x), indicating that a small perturbation α in the input does not
change the predicted label y(x). To achieve the robustness condition in Eq. 2,
Lecuyer et al. [38] introduce an algorithm, called PixelDP. By considering an
input x (e.g., images) as databases in DP parlance, and individual features (e.g.,
pixels) as tuples, PixelDP shows that randomizing the scoring function f(x) to
enforce DP on a small number of pixels in an image guarantees robustness of
predictions against adversarial examples. To randomize f(x), random noise σr is injected into either
input x or an arbitrary hidden layer, resulting in the following (r, δr)-PixelDP condition:
Lemma 1 (r, δr)-PixelDP [38]. Given a randomized scoring function f(x) satisfying (r, δr)-
PixelDP w.r.t. a lp-norm metric, we have:
∀k, ∀α ∈ lp(1) : Efk(x) ≤ erEfk(x+ α) + δr (3)
where Efk(x) is the expected value of fk(x), r is a predefined budget, and δr is a broken probability.
At the prediction time, a certified robustness check is implemented for each prediction. A generalized
robustness condition is proposed as follows:
Eˆlbfk(x) > e2r max
i:i 6=k
Eˆubfi(x) + (1 + er )δr (4)
where Eˆlb and Eˆub are the lower and upper bounds of the expected value Eˆf(x) = 1n
∑
n f(x)n,
derived from the Monte Carlo estimation with an η-confidence, given n is the number of invocations
of f(x) with independent draws in the noise σr. Passing the check for a given input guarantees that
no perturbation exists up to lp(1)-norm, that causes the model to change its prediction. In other
words, the classification model, based on Eˆf(x), i.e., arg maxk Eˆfk(x), is provably robust to attacks
of lp(1)-norm on input x with probability ≥ η. PixelDP does not preserve DP in learning private
parameters θ to protect the training data [38]. That is different from our goal.
3 DPAL with Provable Robustness
Our new DP-preserving mechanism, called DPAL, is presented in Alg. 2 (Appendix C). Our network
can be represented as: f(x) = g(a(x, θ1), θ2), where a(x, θ1) is a feature representation learning
model with x as an input, and g will take the output of a(x, θ1) and return the class scores f(x). At a
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high level, DPAL has three key components: (1) DP a(x, θ1), which is to preserve DP in learning the
feature representation model a(x, θ1); (2) DP Adversarial Learning, which focuses on preserving DP
in adversarial learning, given DP a(x, θ1); and (3) Provable Robustness and Verified Inferring, which
are to compute robustness bounds given an input at the inference time. In particular, given a deep
neural network f with model parameters θ (Lines 1-2), the network is trained over T random training
batches Bt (t ∈ [1, T ]). Each Bt is a set of m training examples xi ∈ D (Lines 4-15).
DP Feature Representation Learning. Our idea is to use auto-encoder to simultaneously learn DP
parameters θ1 and ensure that the output of a(x, θ1) is DP. The reasons we choose an auto-encoder
are: (1) It is easier to train, given its small size; and (2) It can be reused for different predictive models.
Figure 1 shows the structure of our network. We use a data reconstruction function (cross-entropy),
given a batch Bt of the input xi, as follows:
RBt(θ1) =
∑
xi∈Bt
d∑
j=1
[
xij log(1 + e
−θ1jhi) + (1− xij) log(1 + eθ1jhi)
]
(5)
where the affine transformation of xi is hi = θT1 xi, the hidden layer h1 of a(x, θ1) given the batch
Bt is denoted as h1Bt = {θT1 xi}xi∈Bt , and x˜i = θ1hi is the reconstruction of xi.
To preserve 1-DP in learning θ1 where 1 is a privacy budget, we first derive the 1st-order polynomial
approximation ofRBt(θ1) by applying Taylor Expansion [39], denoted as R˜Bt(θ1). Then, Functional
Mechanism [40] is employed to inject noise into coefficients of the approximated function R˜Bt(θ1).
R˜Bt(θ1) =
∑
xi∈Bt
d∑
j=1
2∑
l=1
1∑
r=0
F
(r)
lj (0)
r!
(
θ1jhi
)r
(6)
where F1j(z) = xij log(1 + e−z), F2j(z) = (1 − xij) log(1 + ez), we have that: R˜Bt(θ1) =∑
xi∈Bt
∑d
j=1
[
log 2 + θ1j
(
1
2 − xij
)
hi
]
. In R˜Bt(θ1), parameters θ1j derived from the function
optimization need to be 1-DP. To achieve that, Laplace noise 1mLap(
∆R
1
) is injected into coefficients(
1
2 − xij
)
hi, where ∆R is the sensitivity of R˜Bt(θ1), as follows (log 2 can be ignored):
R˜Bt(θ1) =
∑
xi∈Bt
d∑
j=1
[
θ1j
((1
2
− xij
)
hi +
1
m
Lap(
∆R
1
)
)]
=
∑
xi∈Bt
[ d∑
j=1
(
1
2
θ1jhi)− xix˜i
]
(7)
To ensure that the computation of x˜i does not access the original data, we further inject Laplace
noise 1mLap(
∆R
1
) into xi (Line 6). The perturbed function now becomes:
RBt(θ1) =
∑
xi∈Bt
[ d∑
j=1
(
1
2
θ1jhi)− xix˜i
]
(8)
where xi = xi + 1mLap(
∆R
1
), hi = θ
T
1 xi, hi = hi +
2
mLap(
∆R
1
), and x˜i = θ1hi (Lines 3 and 6).
Let us denote β as the number of hidden neurons in h1; hi is bounded in [−1, 1] to compute the
global sensitivity ∆R as follows:
Lemma 2 The global sensitivity of R˜ over any two neighboring batches, Bt and B′t, is as follows:
∆R ≤ d(β + 2).
By setting ∆R = d(β + 2), we show that the Alg. 2 achieves 1-DP in the following Theorem.
Theorem 1 Algorithm 2 preserves 1-DP in learning θ1.
Detailed proofs of all the Lemmas and Theorems can be found in the Appendices. After achieving
1-DP in learning θ1, we further show that the output of a(x, θ1), which is the perturbed affine
transformation h1Bt = {θ
T
1 xi +
2
mLap(
∆R
1
)}xi∈Bt , is (1/γ)-DP, given γ = 2∆Rm‖θ1‖1,1 and ‖θ1‖1,1
is the maximum 1-norm of θ1’s columns [41]. This is important to tighten the privacy budget
consumption in computing the remaining hidden layers g(a(x, θ1), θ2). In fact, without using
additional information from the original data, the computation of g(a(x, θ1), θ2) is also (1/γ)-DP,
i.e., thanks to the post-processing property of DP. We have the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 Algorithm 2 preserves (1/γ)-DP in computing the affine transformation h1Bt .
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DP Adversarial Learning. To integrate adversarial learning, we first draft adversarial examples
xadvj using benign examples xj , with an ensemble of attack algorithms A and a random perturbation
budget µt ∈ (0, 1], at each step t (Lines 8-13). Adversarial examples (crafted from the training data)
are very similar to the original benign examples. That clearly poses privacy risks. Therefore, xadvj is
perturbed to ensure DP in the training procedure, as follows:
xadvj = x
adv
j +
1
m
Lap(
∆R
1
), where xadvj = xj + µ · sign
(
∇xjL
(
f(xj , θ), y(xj)
))
(9)
where y(xj) is the class prediction result of f(xj) to avoid label leaking of the benign examples xj
during the adversarial example crafting. Similar to xj , training the auto-encoder with adversarial
examples xadvj , i.e., a(x
adv
j , θ1), preserves 1-DP. It can be extended to iterative attacks as follows:
xadvj,0 = xj , x
adv
j,t+1 = x
adv
j,t +
µ
Tµ
· sign
(
∇xadvj,tL
(
f(xadvj,t , θ), y(x
adv
j,t )
))
, xadvj,Tµ = x
adv
j,Tµ +
1
m
Lap(
∆R
1
) (10)
where y(xadvj,t ) is the prediction result of f(x
adv
j,t , θ), and t ∈ [0, Tµ − 1].
Second, we propose a novel DP adversarial objective function LBt(θ2), in which the loss function L
for benign examples is combined with an additional loss function Υ for DP adversarial examples, to
optimize the parameters θ2. The objective function LBt(θ2) is defined as follows:
LBt(θ2) =
1
m(1 + ξ)
( ∑
xi∈Bt
L(f(xi, θ2), yi)+ ξ ∑
xadvj ∈B
adv
t
Υ
(
f(xadvj , θ2), yj
))
(11)
where ξ is a hyper-parameter. For the sake of clarity, in Eq. 11, we denote yi and yj as the true class
labels yxi and yxj of examples xi and xj . Note that x
adv
j and xj share the same label yxj . Bt and
B
adv
t are sets of perturbed inputs xi and DP adversarial examples x
adv
j .
Now we are ready to preserve DP in objective functions L(f(xi, θ2), yi) and Υ(f(xadvj , θ2), yj) in
order to achieve DP in learning θ2. Since the objective functions use the true class labels yi and
yj , we need to protect the labels at the output layer. Let us first present our approach to preserve
DP in the objective function L for benign examples. Given hpii computed from the xi through the
network with Wpi is the parameter at the last hidden layer hpi . Cross-entropy function can be applied
as follows:
LBt
(
θ2
)
=
∑
xi∈Bt
L(f(xi, θ2), yi) = − K∑
k=1
∑
xi
[
yik log(1 + e
−hpiiWpik ) + (1− yik) log(1 + ehpiiWpik )
]
u
K∑
k=1
∑
xi
[
hpiiWpik − (hpiiWpik)yik + log(1 + e−hpiiWpik )
]
By applying Taylor Expansion, the term log(1 + e−hpiiWpik) can be approximated as a 2nd-order
polynomial function:
LBt
(
θ2
)
u
K∑
k=1
∑
xi
[
hpiiWpik − (hpiiWpik)yik − 1
2
|hpiiWpik|+ 1
8
(hpiiWpik)
2
]
= L1Bt
(
θ2
)− L2Bt(θ2)
where L1Bt
(
θ2
)
=
∑K
k=1
∑
xi
[
hpiiWpik − 12 |hpiiWpik| + 18 (hpiiWpik)2
]
, and L2Bt
(
θ2
)
=∑K
k=1
∑
xi
(hpiiyik)Wpik.
Based on the post-processing property of DP [17], hpiBt = {hpii}xi∈B is (1/γ)-DP, since the
computation of h1Bt is (1/γ)-DP (Lemma 3). As a result, we have that: 1) The optimization of the
function L1Bt
(
θ2
)
does not disclose any information from the training data; and 2)
Pr(L1Bt (θ2))
Pr(L
1B′t
(θ2))
=
Pr(hpiBt
)
Pr(h
piB′t
) ≤ e1/γ , given any two neighboring batches Bt and B
′
t. Thus, to preserve DP in LBt
(
θ2
)
,
we only need to preserve 2-DP in the function L2Bt(θ2), which accesses the ground-truth label yik.
Given coefficients hpiiyik, the sensitivity ∆L2 of L2Bt(θ2) is computed as:
Lemma 4 Let Bt and B
′
t be neighboring batches of benign examples, we have the following inequal-
ity: ∆L2 ≤ 2|hpi|, where |hpi| is the number of hidden neurons in hpi .
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The sensitivity of our objective function is notably smaller than the state-of-the-art bound, which
is K(|hpi|+ 14 |hpi|2) [24]. This is crucial to improve our model utility under strong attacks, while
providing the same level of DP protections. The perturbed functions are as follows:
LBt
(
θ2
)
= L1Bt(θ2)− L2Bt(θ2), where L2Bt(θ2) =
K∑
k=1
∑
xi
(
hpiiyik +
1
m
Lap(
∆L2
2
)
)
Wpik (12)
Theorem 2 Algorithm 2 preserves (1/γ + 2)-DP in the optimization of LB
(
θ2
)
.
Since the 1/γ budget, accumulated from the perturbation of the auto-encoder, is tiny in practice
(i.e., ≈ 1e-3), the additional privacy budget used to preserve DP in the function LBt
(
θ2
)
can be
considered 2. We apply the same technique to preserve 2-DP in the optimization of the function
Υ
(
f(xadvj , θ2), yj
)
over the adversarial examples xadvj ∈ B
adv
t . As the perturbed functions L and Υ
are always optimized given two disjoint batches Bt and B
adv
t , the privacy budget used to preserve DP
in the adversarial objective function LBt(θ2) is 2, following the parallel composition property in DP
[17]. The total budget to learn private parameters θ = {θ1, θ2} = arg min{θ1,θ2}(RBt(θ1) +
LBt(θ2)) is (1 + 2). Similar to other objective function-based approaches [24, 40, 42], the
optimization of our mechanism is repeated in T steps, without using additional information from the
original data. It only reads perturbed inputs and perturbed coefficients. In addition, to avoid leaking
information about the randomness, generated batches are not changed between epochs (Lines 1 and
5). Consequently, the privacy budget consumption will not be accumulated at each training step.
Provable Robustness. Now, we establish the correlation between our mechanism and provable
robustness. In the inference time, to derive the provable robustness condition against adversarial
examples x + α, i.e., ∀α ∈ lp(1), PixelDP mechanism randomizes the scoring function f(x) by
injecting robustness noise σr into either input x or a hidden layer, i.e., x′ = x + Lap(
∆xr
r
) or
h′ = h+ Lap(∆
h
r
r
), where ∆xr and ∆
h
r are the sensitivities of x and h, measuring how much x and
h can be changed given the perturbation α ∈ lp(1) in the input x. Monte Carlo estimation of the
expected values Eˆf(x), Eˆlbfk(x), and Eˆubfk(x) are used to derive the robustness condition in Eq. 4.
On the other hand, in our mechanism, the privacy noise σp includes Laplace noise injected into both
input x, i.e., 1mLap(
∆R
1
), and its affine transformation h, i.e., 2mLap(
∆R
1
). Note that the perturbation
of L2Bt
(
θ2
)
is equivalent to L2Bt(θ2) =
∑K
k=1
∑
xi
(hpiiyikWpik +
1
mLap(
∆L2
2
)Wpik). This helps
us to avoid injecting the noise directly into the coefficients hpiiyik. The correlation between our DP
preservation and provable robustness lies in the correlation between the privacy noise σp and the
robustness noise σr.
We can derive a robustness bound by projecting the privacy noise σp on the scale of the robustness
noise σr. Given the input x, let κ = ∆Rm1 /
∆xr
r
, in our mechanism we have that: x = x+Lap(κ∆xr/r).
By applying a group privacy size κ [17, 38], the scoring function f(x) satisfies r-PixelDP given
α ∈ lp(κ), or equivalently is κr-PixelDP given α ∈ lp(1), δr = 0. By applying Lemma 1, we have
∀k, ∀α ∈ lp(κ) : Efk(x) ≤ erEfk(x+ α), or ∀k, ∀α ∈ lp(1) : Efk(x) ≤ e(κr)Efk(x+ α) (13)
With that, we can achieve a robustness condition against lp(κ)-norm attacks, as follows:
Eˆlbfk(x) > e2r max
i:i 6=k
Eˆubfi(x) (14)
with the probability ≥ ηx-confidence, derived from the Monte Carlo estimation of Eˆf(x).
Our mechanism also perturbs h (Eq. 8). Given ϕ = 2∆Rm1 /
∆hr
r
, we further have h = h+ Lap(ϕ∆
h
r
r
).
Therefore, the scoring function f(x) also satisfies r-PixelDP given the perturbation α ∈ lp(ϕ). In
addition to the robustness to the lp(κ)-norm attacks, we can achieve an additional robustness bound
in Eq. 14 against lp(ϕ)-norm attacks. Similar to PixelDP, these robustness conditions can be achieved
as randomization processes in the inference time. They can be considered as two independent and
provable defensive mechanisms applied against two lp-norm attacks, i.e., lp(κ) and lp(ϕ).
One challenging question here is: “What is the general robustness bound, given κ and ϕ?" Intuitively,
our model is robust to attacks with α ∈ lp(κ+ ϕ). We leverage the theory of sequential composition
in DP [17] to theoretically answer this question. Given S independent mechanismsM1, . . . ,MS ,
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whose privacy guarantees are 1, . . . , S-DP with α ∈ lp(1). Each mechanismMs, which takes the
input x and outputs the value of f(x) with the Laplace noise only injected to randomize the layer s
(i.e., no randomization at any other layers), is defined as: ∀s ∈ [1, S],Msf(x) : Rd → fs(x) ∈ RK .
We aim to derive a generalized robustness of any composition scoring function f(M1, . . . ,Ms|x)
bounded in [0, 1], defined as follows:
f(M1, . . . ,MS |x) :
S∏
s=1
Msf(x)⇔ f(M1, . . . ,MS |x) : Rd →
S∏
s=1
fs(x) ∈ RK (15)
Our setting follows the sequential composition in DP [17]. Thus, we can prove that the expected value
Ef(M1, . . . ,MS |x) is insensitive to small perturbations α ∈ lp(1), and we derive our composition
of robustness, as follows:
Theorem 3 (Composition of Robustness) Given S independent mechanismsM1, . . . ,MS . Given
any sequential function f(M1, . . . ,MS |x), and let Eˆlb and Eˆub are lower and upper bounds with an
η-confidence, for the Monte Carlo estimation of Eˆf(M1, . . . ,MS |x) = 1n
∑
n f(M1, . . . ,MS |x)n.
For any input x, if ∃k ∈ K so that
Eˆlbfk(M1, . . . ,MS |x) > e2(
∑S
s=1 s) max
i:i 6=k
Eˆubfi(M1, . . . ,MS |x), (16)
then the predicted label k = arg maxk Eˆfk(M1, . . . ,MS |x), is robust to adversarial exam-
ples x + α, ∀α ∈ lp(1), with probability ≥ η, by satisfying: Eˆfk(M1, . . . ,MS |x + α) >
maxi:i 6=k Eˆfi(M1, . . . ,MS |x+ α), which is the targeted robustness condition in Eq. 2.
To apply the composition of robustness in our mechanism, the noise injections into the input x and its
affine transformation h can be considered as two mechanismsMx andMh, sequentially applied as
(Mh(x),Mx(x)). WhenMh(x) is applied by invoking f(x) with independent draws in the noise
χ2, the noise χ1 injected into x is fixed (Lines 3 and 6); and vice-versa. By applying group privacy
[17] with sizes κ and ϕ, the scoring functions fx(x) and fh(x), givenMx andMh, are κr-DP and
ϕr-DP given α ∈ lp(1). With Theorem 3, we have a generalized robustness bound as follows:
Proposition 1 (DPAL Robustness). For any input x, if ∃k ∈ K : Eˆlbfk(Mh,Mx|x) >
e2r maxi:i 6=k Eˆubfi(Mh,Mx|x), then the predicted label k of our function f(Mh,Mx|x) is robust
to small perturbations α ∈ lp(κ+ ϕ) with the probability ≥ η, by satisfying ∀α ∈ lp(κ+ ϕ) :
Eˆfk(Mh,Mx|x+ α) > max
i:i 6=k
Eˆfi(Mh,Mx|x+ α)
Training and Verified Inferring. Our model is trained similarly to training typical deep neural
networks. Note that we optimize for a single draw of noise during training (Line 3). Parameters θ1
and θ2 are independently updated by applying gradient descent (Line 15). Regarding the inference
time, we implement a verified inference procedure as a post-processing step (Lines 16-21). Our
verified inference returns a robustness size guarantee for each example x, which is the maximal
value of κ + ϕ, for which the robustness condition in Proposition 1 holds. Maximizing κ + ϕ is
equivalent to maximizing the robustness epsilon r, which is the only parameter controlling the size
of κ + ϕ; since, all the other hyper-parameters, i.e., ∆R, m, 1, 2, θ1, θ2, ∆xr , and ∆
h
r are fixed
given a well-trained model f(x):
(κ+ ϕ)max = max
r
∆Rr
m1
(
1
∆xr
+
2
∆hr
) s.t. Eˆlbfk(x) > e2r max
i:i 6=k
Eˆubfi(x) (17)
The prediction on an example x is robust to attacks up to (κ+ ϕ)max. The failure probability 1-η
can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the number of invocations of f(x), with independent
draws in the noise. Similar to [38], Hoeffding’s inequality can be applied to bound the approximation
error in Eˆfk(x). We use the following sensitivity bounds ∆hr =
√
β‖θ1‖∞ where ‖θ1‖∞ is the
maximum 1-norm of θ1’s rows, and ∆xr = µd
2. We also propose a new way to draw independent
noise following the distribution of χ1 + 1mLap(0,
∆R
1
/ψ) for the input x and 2χ2 + 2mLap(0,
∆R
1
/ψ)
for the transformation h, where χ1 and χ2 are the fixed noise used to train the network, and ψ is a
parameter to control the distribution shifts. This works better without affecting the DP bounds and
the robustness. (Details are in Appendix L.)
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4 Experimental Results
We have carried out an extensive experiment on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. We consider the
well-known class of l∞ bounded adversaries to see whether our mechanism could retain high model
utility, while providing strong DP guarantees and protections against adversarial examples, compared
with existing mechanisms. Our DPAL mechanism is evaluated in comparison with state-of-the-art
mechanisms in: (1) DP-preserving algorithms in deep learning, i.e., DP-SGD [8], AdLM [24], and
in (2) Provable robustness, i.e., PixelDP [38]. To preserve DP, DP-SGD injects random noise into
gradients of parameters, while AdLM is a Functional Mechanism-based approach. PixelDP is one
of the state-of-the-art mechanisms providing provable robustness using DP bounds. The baseline
models share the same design in our experiment. Four white-box attacks were used, including FGSM,
I-FGSM, Momentum Iterative Method (MIM) [43], and MadryEtAl [44]. All the models share the
same structure, consisting of 2 and 3 convolution layers, respectively for MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets (detailed configurations are in Appendix M.1). We apply two accuracy metrics as follows:
conventional acc =
∑|test|
i=1 isCorrect(xi)
|test| ; certified acc =
∑|test|
i=1 isCorrect(xi) & isRobust(xi)
|test|
where |test| is the number of test cases, isCorrect(·) returns 1 if the model makes a correct
prediction (else, returns 0), and isRobust(·) returns 1 if the robustness size is larger than a given
attack bound µa (else, returns 0). It is important to note that x ∈ [−1, 1]d in our setting, which is
different from a common setting x ∈ [0, 1]d. Thus, the attack size µ = 0.3 in the setting of x ∈ [0, 1]d
is equivalent to an attack size 2µ = 0.6 in our setting. The reason for using x ∈ [−1, 1]d is to achieve
better model utility, while retaining the same global sensitivities to preserve DP, compared with
x ∈ [0, 1]d.  = (1 + 2) is used to indicate the DP budget used to protect the training data;
meanwhile, r is the budget for robustness. r is set to be 1.0 in the training of our model.
MNIST. Figures 2 and 3 (Appendix M.2) illustrate the conventional accuracy of each model as a
function of the privacy budget (1 + 2) on the MNIST dataset under l∞(µa)-norm attacks, with
µa ∈ {0.1, 0.2}. It is clear that our DPAL outperforms AdLM and DP-SGD, in all cases, i.e.,
p < 3e − 10 (2 tail t-test). AdLM has better accuracies compared with DP-SGD. However, there
is no guarantee provided in AdLM. Thus, the accuracy of the AdLM algorithm seems to show no
effect against adversarial examples, when the privacy budget is varied. This is different given our
DPAL model and the DP-SGD model, whose accuracies are proportional to the privacy budget.
Note that when µa = 0.2, which is a pretty strong attack, AdLM and DP-SGD become defenseless.
By constrast, our model just shows a small drop in terms of accuracy, when µa is increased from
0.1 to 0.2, i.e., 1.76% on average, across all attacks and privacy budgets. This illustrates that our
mechanism notably enhances the robustness, by incorporating DP into adversarial learning in an
ensemble approach.
Figure 6 illustrates the certified accuracy of each model as a function of the adversarial perturbation
µa ∈ [0.05, 0.6]. The privacy budget is set to 2.0, offering a reasonable privacy protection. Following
[38], in PixelDP, the construction attack bound r is set to 0.1, offering a pretty reasonable defense.
It is clear that with small perturbations, i.e., µa ≤ 0.2, PixelDP achieves better certified accuracies
under all attacks. This is reasonable, since PixelDP does not preserve DP to protect the training data,
compared with our DPAL. Meanwhile, our model outperforms PixelDP when µa ≥ 0.3, indicating a
stronger defense to more aggressive attacks. More importantly, our DPAL has a consistent certified
accuracy to different attacks given different perturbation budgets, compared with PixelDP. In fact,
when µa is increased from 0.05 to 0.6, our DPAL shows a small drop (9.88% in average, from
82.28%(µa = 0.05) to 72.40%(µa = 0.6)), compared with a huge drop of the PixelDP, i.e., from
94.19%(µa = 0.05) to 9.08%(µa = 0.6) on average under I-FGSM, MIM, and MadryEtAl attacks,
and to 77.47%(µa = 0.6) under FGSM attack. This is a promising result.
Our key observations are as follows. (1) Incorporating ensemble adversarial learning into DP
preservation does enhance the consistency, robustness, and accuracy of our model against different
attack algorithms with different levels of perturbations. (2) Our DPAL model outperforms baseline
algorithms, including both DP-preserving and non-private approaches, in terms of conventional
accuracy and certified accuracy in most of the cases.
CIFAR-10. Results on the CIFAR-10 dataset strengthen our observations. In Figures 4 and 5
(Appendix M.2), our DPAL clearly outperforms baseline models in all cases, especially when the pri-
vacy budget is small (< 6), yielding strong privacy protections. DP-SGD achieves better performance,
compared with AdLM. When the privacy budget is increased from 2 to 10, the conventional accuracy
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of our DPAL model increases from 44.1% to 48.77%, showing a 4.67% improvement on average.
However, the conventional accuracy of our model under adversarial example attacks is still low, i.e.,
44.1% on average given the privacy budget at 2.0. This opens a long-term research avenue to achieve
better robustness under strong privacy guarantees. The accuracy of our model is also consistent given
different attacks with different adversarial perturbations under varied DP protections. Figure 7 also
shows that our DPAL model is more accurate than PixelDP (r = 0.1) in terms of certified accuracy
in all cases, with the privacy budget set to 4.0, offering a reasonable privacy protection.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we established a connection among DP preservation to protect the training data,
adversarial learning, and provable robustness. A sequential composition robustness theory was
introduced to generalize robustness given any sequential and bounded function of independent
defensive mechanisms. An original DP-preserving mechanism was designed to address the trade-off
among model utility, privacy loss, and robustness by tightening the global sensitivity bound. Our
model shows promising results and opens a long-term avenue to achieve better robustness under
strong privacy guarantees.
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A Notations and Terminologies
Table 1: Notations and Terminologies.
D and x Training data with benign examples x ∈ [−1, 1]d
y = {y1, . . . , yK} One-hot label vector of K categories
f : Rd → RK Function/model f that maps inputs xto a vector of scores f(x) = {f1(x), . . . , fK(x)}
yx ∈ y A single true class label of example x
y(x) = maxk∈K fk(x) Predicted label for the example x given the function f
xadv = x+ α Adversarial example where α is the perturbation
lp(µ) = {α ∈ Rd : ‖α‖p ≤ µ} The lp-norm ball of attack radius µ
(r, δr) Robustness budget r and broken probability δr
Efk(x) The expected value of fk(x)
Eˆlb and Eˆub
Lower and upper bounds of
the expected value Eˆf(x) = 1n
∑
n f(x)n
a(x, θ1) Feature representation learning model with x and parameters θ1
Bt A batch of benign examples xi
RBt(θ1) Data reconstruction function given Bt in a(x, θ1)
h1Bt = {θT1 xi}xi∈Bt The values of all hidden neurons in the hidden layer h1of a(x, θ1) given the batch Bt
R˜Bt(θ1) andRBt(θ1) Approximated and perturbed functions ofRBt(θ1)
xi and x˜i Perturbed and reconstructed inputs xi
∆R = d(β + 2) Sensitivity of the approximated function R˜Bt(θ1)
h1Bt Perturbed affine transformation h1Bt
xadvj = x
adv
j +
1
mLap(
∆R
1
) DP adversarial examples crafting from benign example xj
Bt and B
adv
t Sets of perturbed inputs xi and DP adversarial examples x
adv
j
LBt
(
θ2
)
Loss function of perturbed benign examples in Bt, given θ2
Υ
(
f(xadvj , θ2), yj
)
Loss function of DP adversarial examples xadvj , given θ2
LBt
(
θ2
)
DP loss function for perturbed benign examples Bt
L2Bt(θ2) A part of the loss function LBt
(
θ2
)
that needs to be DP
f(M1, . . . ,Ms|x) Composition scoring function givenindependent randomizing mechanismsM1, . . . ,Ms
∆xr and ∆
h
r Sensitivities of x and h, given the perturbation α ∈ lp(1)
(1 + 2) Privacy budget to protect the training data D
(κ+ ϕ)max Robustness size guarantee given an input x at the inference time
B Pseudo-code of Adversarial Training [37]
Given a loss function:
L(θ) =
1
m1 + ξm2
( ∑
xi∈Bt
L(f(xi, θ), yi)+ ξ ∑
xadvj ∈Badvt
Υ
(
f(xadvj , θ), yj
))
, (18)
where m1 and m2 correspondingly are the numbers of examples in Bt and Badvt at each training step.
The typical adversarial learning in [37] is as follows:
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Training [37]
Input: Database D, loss function L, parameters θ, batch sizes m1 and m2, learning rate %t, and
weight control parameter ξ
1: Initialize θ randomly
2: for t ∈ [T ] do
3: Take a random batch Bt with the size m1, and a random batch Ba with the size m2
4: Craft adversarial examples Badvt = {xadvj }j∈[1,m2] from corresponding benign examples
xj ∈ Ba
5: Descent: θ ← θ − %t∇θL(θ)
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C Pseudo-code of DPAL Mechanism
Algorithm 2 DPAL Mechanism
Input: Database D, loss function L, parameters θ, batch size m, learning rate %t, privacy bud-
gets: 1 and 2, robustness parameters: r, ∆xr , and ∆
h
r , adversarial attack size µa, the number
of invocations n, ensemble attacks A, a parameter ψ, and the size |hpi| of hpi, and a parameter
ξ
1: Randomly Initialize θ = {θ1, θ2}, B = {B1, . . . , BN/m} s.t. ∀B ∈ B : B is a random batch
with the size m, B1 ∩ . . . ∩BN/m = ∅, and B1 ∪ . . . ∪BN/m = D
2: Construct a deep neural network f with hidden layers {h1, . . . ,hpi}, where hpi is the last
hidden layer
3: Draw Noise χ1 ← [Lap(∆R1 )]d, χ2 ← [Lap(∆R1 )]β , χ3 ← [Lap(∆L22 )]|hpi|
4: for t ∈ [T ] do
5: Take a random batch Bt ∈ B
6: Perturb ∀xi ∈ Bt : xi ← xi + χ1m ; hi ← hi + 2χ2m
7: Assign Bt ← {xi}xi∈Bt
8: Ensemble DP Adversarial Examples:
9: Draw Random Perturbation Value µt ∈ (0, 1]
10: B
adv
t ← ∅
11: for i ∈ A do
12: Take a random batch Ba with the size m/|A|
13: ∀xj ∈ Ba: Craft xadvj by using attack algorithm A[i] with l∞(µt), B
adv
t ← B
adv
t ∪ xadvj
14: Perturb LBt(θ2) with the noise
χ3
m
15: Descent: θ1 ← θ1 − %t∇θ1RBt(θ1); θ2 ← θ2 − %t∇θ2LBt(θ2)
Output: (1 + 2)-DP parameters θ = {θ1, θ2}, robust model with an r budget
16: Verified Inferring: (an input x, attack size µa)
17: Compute robustness size (κ+ ϕ)max in Eq. 17 of x
18: if (κ+ ϕ)max ≥ µ then
19: Return isRobust(x) = True, label k, (κ+ ϕ)max
20: else
21: Return isRobust(x) = False, label k, (κ+ ϕ)max
D Proof of Lemma 2
Inspired by the proof of Functional Mechanism [40], we have our proof as follows:
Proof 1 Assume that Bt and B′t differ in the last tuple, xm (x′m). Then,
∆R =
d∑
j=1
[∥∥ ∑
xi∈Bt
1
2
hi −
∑
x′i∈B′t
1
2
h′i
∥∥
1
+
∥∥ ∑
xi∈Bt
xij −
∑
x′i∈B′t
x′ij
∥∥
1
]
≤ 2 max
xi
d∑
j=1
(‖1
2
hi‖1 + ‖xij‖1) ≤ d(β + 2)
E Proof of Lemma 1
Inspired by the proof of Functional Mechanism [40], we have our proof as follows:
Proof 2 Given χ1 drawn as a Laplace noise [Lap(∆R1 )]
d and χ2 drawn as a Laplace noise
[Lap(∆R1 )]
β , the perturbation of the coefficient φ ∈ Φ = { 12hi, xi}, denoted as φ, can be rewritten
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as follows:
for φ ∈ {xi} : φ =
∑
xi∈B
(φxi +
χ1
m
) =
∑
xi∈B
φxi + χ1 =
∑
xi∈B
φxi + [Lap(
∆R
1
)]d
for φ ∈ {1
2
hi} : φ =
∑
xi∈B
1
2
(hi +
2χ2
m
) =
∑
xi∈B
(φxi +
χ2
m
) =
∑
xi∈B
φxi + χ2 =
∑
xi∈B
φxi + [Lap(
∆R
1
)]β
we have
Pr
(RBt(θ1)) = d∏
j=1
∏
φ∈Φ
exp
(− 1‖∑xi∈B φxi − φ‖1
∆R
)
∆R is set to d(β + 2), we have that:
Pr
(RBt(θ1))
Pr
(RB′t(θ1)) =
∏d
j=1
∏
φ∈Φ exp
(− 1‖∑xi∈Bt φxi−φ‖1∆R )∏d
j=1
∏
φ∈Φ exp
(− 1‖∑x′i∈B′t φx′i−φ‖1∆R )
≤
d∏
j=1
∏
φ∈Φ
exp(
1
∆R
∥∥∥ ∑
xi∈Bt
φxi −
∑
x′i∈B′t
φx′i
∥∥∥
1
)
≤
d∏
j=1
∏
φ∈Φ
exp(
1
∆R
2 max
xi∈Bt
∥∥φxi∥∥1) ≤ exp(1d(β + 2)∆R )
= exp(1)
Consequently, the computation of RBt(θ1) preserves 1-DP in Alg. 2. In addition, the parameter
optimization ofRBt(θ1) only uses the perturbed data xi in the computations of hi, hi, and x˜i. Thus,
the perturbed optimal parameters θ1 is 1-DP.
F Proof of Lemma 3
Proof 3 Regarding the computation of h1Bt = {θ
T
1 xi}xi∈Bt , we can see that hi = θ
T
1 xi is a linear
function of x. The sensitivity of a function h is defined as the maximum change in output, that can be
generated by a change in the input [38]. Therefore, the global sensitivity of h1 can be computed as
follows:
∆h1 =
‖∑xi∈Bt θT1 xi −∑x′i∈B′t θT1 x′i‖1
‖∑xi∈Bt xi −∑x′i∈B′t x′i‖1
≤ max
xi∈Bt
‖θT1 xi‖1
‖xi‖1 ≤ ‖θ
T
1 ‖1,1
following matrix norms [41]: ‖θT1 ‖1,1 is the maximum 1-norm of θ1’s columns. By injecting Laplace
noise Lap(∆h11 ) into h1Bt , i.e., h1Bt = {θ
T
1 xi + Lap(
∆h1
1
)}xi∈Bt , we can preserve 1-DP in the
computation of h1Bt . Let us set ∆h1 = ‖θ
T
1 ‖1,1, γ = 2∆Rm∆h1 , and χ2 drawn as a Laplace noise
[Lap(∆R1 )]
β , in our mechanism, the perturbed affine transformation h1Bt is presented as:
h1Bt = {θ
T
1 xi +
2χ2
m
}xi∈Bt = {θ
T
1 xi +
2
m
[Lap(
∆R
1
)]β}xi∈Bt
= {θT1 xi + [Lap(
γ∆h1
1
)]β}xi∈Bt
= {θT1 xi + [Lap(
∆h1
1/γ
)]β}xi∈Bt
This results in an (1/γ)-DP affine transformation h1Bt = {θ
T
1 xi + [Lap(
∆h1
1/γ
)]β}xi∈Bt . Therefore,
Lemma 3 does hold.
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G Proof of Lemma 4
Proof 4 Assume that Bt and B
′
t differ in the last tuple, and xm (x
′
m) be the last tuple in Bt (B
′
t),
we have that
∆L2 =
K∑
k=1
∥∥∥ ∑
xi∈Bt
(hpiiyik)−
∑
x′i∈B
′
t
(h′piiy
′
ik)
∥∥∥
1
=
K∑
k=1
∥∥hpimymk − h′pimy′mk∥∥1
Since ymk and y′mk are one-hot encoding, we have that ∆L2 ≤ 2 maxxi‖hpii‖1. Given hpii ∈ [−1, 1],
we have
∆L2 ≤ 2|hpi| (19)
Lemma 4 does hold.
H Proof of Lemma 2
Proof 5 Let Bt and B
′
t be neighboring batches of benign examples, and χ3 drawn as Laplace noise
[Lap(∆L22 )]
|hpi|, the perturbations of the coefficients hpiiyik can be rewritten as:
hpiiyik =
∑
xi
(hpiiyik +
χ3
m
) =
∑
xi
(hpiiyik) + [Lap(
∆L2
2
)]|hpi|
Since all the coefficients are perturbed, and given ∆L2 = 2|hpi|, we have that
Pr(LBt(θ2))
Pr(LB′t(θ2))
=
Pr(L1Bt(θ2))
Pr(L1B′t(θ2))
× Pr(L2Bt(θ2))
Pr(L2B′t(θ2))
≤ e1/γ
K∑
k=1
exp(− 2‖
∑
xi
hpiiyik−hpiiyik‖1
∆L2
)
exp(− 2‖
∑
x′
i
hpiiyik−hpiiyik‖1
∆L2
)
≤ e1/γ
K∑
k=1
exp(
2
∆L2
∥∥∑
xi
hpiiyik −
∑
x′i
hpiiyik
∥∥
1
)
≤ e1/γ exp( 2
∆L2
2 max
xi
‖hpii‖1) = e1/γ+2
The computation of L2Bt
(
θ2
)
preserves (1/γ + 2)-differential privacy. The optimization of
L2Bt
(
θ2
)
does not access additional information from the original input xi ∈ B. Consequently, the
optimal perturbed parameters θ2 derived from L2Bt
(
θ2
)
are (1/γ + 2)-DP.
I Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5 Given S independent mechanismsM1, . . . ,MS , which are 1, . . . , S-DP w.r.t a lp-norm
metric, then the expected output value of any sequential function f of them, i.e., f(M1, . . . ,MS |x),
with bounded output f(M1, . . . ,MS |x) ∈ [0, 1], meets the following property: ∀α ∈ lp(1) :
Ef(M1, . . . ,MS |x) ≤ e(
∑S
s=1 s)Ef(M1, . . . ,MS |x+ α)
Proof 6 Thanks to the sequential composition theory in DP [17], f(M1, . . . ,MS |x) is (
∑
s s)-DP,
since for any O =
∏S
s=1 os ∈
∏S
s=1 f
s(x)(∈ RK), we have that
P
(
f(M1, . . . ,MS |x) = O
)
P
(
f(M1, . . . ,MS |x+ α) = O
) = P (M1f(x) = o1) . . . P (MSf(x) = oS)
P (M1f(x+ α) = o1) . . . P (MSf(x+ α) = oS)
≤
S∏
s=1
exp(s) = e
(
∑S
s=1 s)
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As a result, we have
P
(
f(M1, . . . ,MS |x)
) ≤ e(∑i i)P (f(M1, . . . ,MS |x+ α))
The sequential composition of the expected output is as:
Ef(M1, . . . ,MS |x) =
∫ 1
0
P
(
f(M1, . . . ,MS |x) > t
)
dt
≤ e(
∑
s s)
∫ 1
0
P
(
f(M1, . . . ,MS |x+ α) > t
)
dt
= e(
∑
s s)Ef(M1, . . . ,MS |x+ α)
Lemma 5 does hold.
J Proof of Theorem 3
Proof 7 ∀α ∈ lp(1), from Lemma 5, with probability ≥ η, we have that
Eˆfk(M1, . . . ,MS |x+ α) ≥ Eˆfk(M1, . . . ,MS |x)
e(
∑s
s=1 s)
≥ Eˆlbfk(M1, . . . ,MS |x)
e(
∑S
s=1 s)
(20)
In addition, we also have
∀i 6= k : Eˆfi:i 6=k(M1, . . . ,MS |x+ α) ≤ e(
∑S
s=1 s)Eˆfi:i 6=k(M1, . . . ,MS |x)
⇒ ∀i 6= k : Eˆfi(M1, . . . ,MS |x+ α) ≤ e(
∑S
s=1 s) max
i:i6=k
Eˆubfi(M1, . . . ,MS |x) (21)
Using the hypothesis (Eq. 16) and the first inequality (Eq. 20), we have that
Eˆfk(M1, . . . ,MS |x+ α) > e
2(
∑S
s=1 s) maxi:i 6=k Eˆubfi(M1, . . . ,MS |x)
e(
∑S
s=1 s)
> e(
∑S
s=1 s) max
i:i 6=k
Eˆubfi(M1, . . . ,MS |x)
Now, we apply the third inequality (Eq. 21), we have that
∀i 6= k : Eˆfk(M1, . . . ,MS |x+ α) > Eˆfi(M1, . . . ,MS |x+ α)
⇔ Eˆfk(M1, . . . ,MS |x+ α) > max
i:i 6=k
Eˆfi(M1, . . . ,MS |x+ α)
The Theorem 3 does hold.
K Proof of Proposition 1
Proof 8 ∀α ∈ lp(1), by applying Theorem 3, we have
Eˆlbfk(Mh,Mx|x) > e2(κr+ϕr) max
i:i 6=k
Eˆubfi(Mh,Mx|x)
> e2(κ+ϕ)r max
i:i6=k
Eˆubfi(Mh,Mx|x)
Furthermore, by applying group privacy, we have that
∀α ∈ lp(κ+ ϕ) : Eˆlbfk(Mh,Mx|x) > e2r max
i:i6=k
Eˆubfi(Mh,Mx|x)
By applying Proof 7, it is straight to have
∀α ∈ lp(κ+ ϕ) : Eˆfk(Mh,Mx|x+ α) > max
i:i 6=k
Eˆfk(Mh,Mx|x+ α)
with probability ≥ η. Proposition 1 does hold.
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L Monte Carlo Estimation of Eˆf(x)
Recall that the Monte Carlo estimation is applied to estimate the expected value Eˆf(x) =
1
n
∑
n f(x)n, where n is the number of invocations of f(x) with independent draws in the noise,
i.e., 1mLap(0,
∆R
1
) and 2mLap(0,
∆R
1
) in our case. When 1 is small (indicating a strong privacy
protection), it causes a notably large distribution shift among independent draws of the Laplace noise.
In addition, let us denote a single draw in the noise as χ1 = 1mLap(0,
∆R
1
) used to train the scoring
function f(x), the model converges to the point that the noise χ1 and 2χ1 need to be correspondingly
added into x and h in order to make correct predictions. χ1 can be approximated as Lap(χ1, %),
where %→ 0. It is clear to see that independent draws of the noise 1mLap(0, ∆R1 ) have distribution
shifts with the fixed noise χ1 u Lap(χ1, %). These distribution shifts can also be large, when noise
is large. We have experienced that these distribution shifts in having independent draws of noise to
estimate Eˆf(x) can notably degrade the inference accuracy of the scoring function, when privacy
budget 1 is small resulting in a large amount of noise injected to provide strong privacy guarantees.
To address this problem, one solution is to increase the number of invocations of f(x), i.e., n, to
a huge number per prediction. This is impractical in real-world scenarios. We propose a novel
way to draw independent noise following the distribution of χ1 + 1mLap(0,
∆R
1
/ψ) for the input
x and 2χ1 + 2mLap(0,
∆R
1
/ψ) for the affine transformation h, where ψ is a hyper-parameter to
control the distribution shifts. This approach works well and does not affect the DP bounds and the
provable robustness condition, since: (1) Our mechanism achieves both DP and provable robustness
in the training process; and (2) It is clear that Eˆf(x) = 1n
∑
n f(x)n =
1
n
∑
n g
(
a(x + χ1 +
1
mLapn(0,
∆R
1
/ψ), θ1) + 2χ1 +
2
mLapn(0,
∆R
1
/ψ), θ2
)
, where Lapn(0, ∆R1 /ψ) is the n-th draw
of the noise. When n→∞, Eˆf(x) will converge to 1n
∑
n g
(
a(x+χ1, θ1) + 2χ1, θ2
)
, which aligns
well with the convergence point of the scoring function f(x). Injecting χ1 and 2χ1 to x and h during
the estimation of Eˆf(x) yields better performance, without affecting the DP bounds and the provable
robustness condition.
M Supplemental Experimental Results
M.1 Model Configuration
The MNIST database of handwritten digits [18]. Each example is a 28 × 28 size gray-level image.
The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of color images belonging to 10 classes, i.e., airplanes, dogs, etc. The
dataset is splitted into 50,000 training samples and 10,000 test samples [19].
MNIST: We used two convolution layers (32 and 64 features). Each hidden neuron connects with a
5x5 unit patch. A fully-connected layer has 256 units. The batch size m was set to 2,400, ξ = 1.5,
ψ = 2. I-FGSM, MIM, and MadryEtAl were used to draft l∞(µ) adversarial examples in training,
with Tµ = 10. CIFAR-10: We used three convolution layers (128, 128, and 256 features). Each
hidden neuron connects with a 3x3 unit patch in the first layer, and a 5x5 unit patch in other layers.
One fully-connected layer has 256 neurons. The batch size m was set to 1,800, ξ = 1.5, ψ = 10, and
Tµ = 3. The ensemble of attack algorithms A includes I-FGSM, MIM, and MadryEtAl. We do use
data augmentation, including random crop, random flip, and random constrast. The implementation
of our mechanism is available in TensorFlow. The experiments were conducted on a single GPU, i.e.,
NVIDIA GTX TITAN X, 12 GB with 3,072 CUDA cores.
To select the best hyper-parameters, including ξ ∈ [1, 6] and ψ ∈ [1, 10], for each dataset, we varied
the privacy budget (1+2) and the attack size µa, given each value of ξ and ψ, i.e., (1+2) ∈ [0.2, 2]
in MNIST dataset, (1 + 2) ∈ [2, 10] in CIFAR-10 dataset, and µa ∈ [0.05, 0.6] for both datasets.
Each setting is executed 3 times; resulting in 105 runs in total for each value of ξ and ψ. The average
accuracies were used to identify the best values of ξ and ψ for both datasets. Then, the best values
were used to conduct our experiments (Figures 2-7). Each setting of each algorithm was executed 7
times, and the average results were reported. Learning rate %t was set to 1e− 4.
M.2 Complete Experimental Results
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(a) I-FGSM attacks (b) FGSM attacks
(c) MIM attacks (d) MadryEtAl attacks
Figure 2: Conventional accuracy on the MNIST dataset, under l∞(µa = 0.1).
(a) I-FGSM attacks (b) FGSM attacks
(c) MIM attacks (d) MadryEtAl attacks
Figure 3: Conventional accuracy on the MNIST dataset, under l∞(µa = 0.2).
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(a) I-FGSM attacks (b) FGSM attacks
(c) MIM attacks (d) MadryEtAl attacks
Figure 4: Conventional accuracy on the CIFAR-10 dataset, given l∞(µa = 0.1).
(a) I-FGSM attacks (b) FGSM attacks
(c) MIM attacks (d) MadryEtAl attacks
Figure 5: Conventional accuracy on the CIFAR-10 dataset, given l∞(µa = 0.2).
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(a) I-FGSM attacks (b) FGSM attacks
(c) MIM attacks (d) MadryEtAl attacks
Figure 6: Certified accuracy on the MNIST dataset. The privacy budget is set to 2, offering a
reasonable privacy protection.
(a) I-FGSM attacks (b) FGSM attacks
(c) MIM attacks (d) MadryEtAl attacks
Figure 7: Certified accuracy on the CIFAR-10 dataset. The privacy budget is set to 4, offering a
reasonable privacy protection.
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